Proposition : that the logical necessity for the capacity to define existence must entail (through the principle of reflexivity) the existence of such capacity. That this capacity must have a [minimally requisite] structure (similar to, e.g., a mechanical logical device employing recognition-processes) may be self-evident : to such extent, then, by introspection can arise, as illusion, the existence of a universe speciously distinct from the mind. [The mind, in viewing itself, is by some process deluded into imagining that it is viewing other-than-the self.] Said process can be explicated by the postulated aequating of temporal inversion with spatial inversion, especially when such inversion may include likewise other analogous reversals. [In such scheme, the running backwards of the time-frame of inverted space through our forwards-moving consciousness time-frame (so as to provide a simultaneous net zero motion of time) can readily provide an illusorily distinct object of consciousness – illusorily so, simply because that inverted space may be (aequivalently, is) one’s self (mind) in the future (or, aequally well-stated, in the past, since through this means one’s future/past consciousness is recycled [through one’s consciousness of the praesent] in the resurgence backwards of returning time-flux).

Comment : that the returning time-flux would be continuously erasing the loop of one’s already-generated (so that one will have to live it out again [repeated ad infinitum], order again to produce something to be erased in one’s future opposite ½ of life-cyclings, when ro^les are ostensibly reversed) futurality, may be taken as the diagrammatic model for this theoretic repraesentational scheme.

Further refinements to theory : that a more descriptive characterization of the time-line as a [double-stranded, for the double-directional nature of time] knitted or crocheted craftwork, so constructed that each yarn-knotting is a site whence, as vantage-point, can be formulated some adequate homology the knitting-crocheting as a whole, can well be conjectured, if the knotting is to repraesent some other person encountered, so that that person’s perspective will also need to be made definable in such-like manner. Herein, it is the other person’s description of a differing point-of-view (as viewed to a different vantage-point) that may give rise to the specious notion of the collective totality other persons as being distinct from one’s totality of one’s own experience (and hence of such collective totality of other persons as a separable world); even though the experience by such other persons may be in actuality merely a derivable (by topologic transformation, through some well-defined rule) repraesentation of one’s own experiential totality.